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Abstract
This paper proposes that while many plans and 
solutions to the transport problems of the 21st Century 
have been mooted, very few have succeeded in 
significantly improving the situation within Europe. It 
is suggested that many schemes face problems at the 
project implementation stage due to adverse public 
and/or political reaction. This paper incorporates a 
series of vignettes, several of which are based on in-
depth interviews with practitioners directly involved 
in the implementation of the schemes in question. It 
looks at several existing ‘radical’ transport schemes 
from around the world in an attempt to draw lessons as 
to how they overcame this, not least in terms of how 
the implementation of alternative strategies by 
European policy-makers could be shaped and adopted 
world-wide.
Keywords
case studies, policy implementation, TDM, transport 
demand management, transport policy.
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged across the developed 
world that transport systems within many of its 
member states are stretched to breaking point. Since 
the 1950s, nearly all developed countries have 
witnessed a ‘mobility explosion’. For instance, between 
1991 and 2001, car and taxi traffic levels in billion 
vehicle kilometres increased by 12% in the United 
States, 44% in Japan, 8% in Germany, and 14% in Great 
Britain, while usage almost doubled in Portugal (85%) 
and more than doubled in Spain (107%), while usage 
appears to have fallen in Ireland and Sweden (DfT, 
2003). 
This has resulted from an increase in road capacity, 
income and population. Both income and population 
growth are viewed as the major drivers behind 
increasing vehicle ownership and use (Marshall et al., 
1997; Marshall and Banister, 2000).
Between 1970 and 2001, vehicle ownership in the 
EU-15 almost tripled from 62.48 million to 184.70 
million. Thus, by 2001 there were 488 cars per 1000 EU-
15 inhabitants (Eurostat, 2003). A report by the OECD 
predicted that this would increase by a further 50% 
between 1995 and 2020, resulting in vehicle ownership 
levels of more than 600 per 1000 people in many EU-15 
countries (OECD, 1995a).
While many plans and solutions have been 
debated, none has yet succeeded in significantly 
improving the transport situation within Europe. For 
instance, in the UK, road user charging has been 
consistently touted by academics and transport 
planners as the ideal policy mechanism for traffic 
reduction since the 1960s, but was only implemented for 
the first time on a sizable scale in February 2003. 
Moreover, the long term future of the central London 
scheme is still by no means guaranteed, with the 
Conservative Mayoral candidate Stephen Norris 
having declared his intention to abolish the scheme if 
elected (Wolmar, 2004). It is suggested within this 
paper that many of the problems experienced when 
trying to introduce ‘radical’ transport schemes are due 
to public and/or political opposition at the project 
implementation stage. A number of additional 
barriers – most notably resource, institutional and 
policy barriers, social, cultural, legal, and physical 
barriers – have also precluded such actions (Banister, 
2002). 
The most difficult barriers to overcome are the 
social and cultural barriers, which can also be 
described as public and/or political opposition. This 
perception is supported by Gunn (1978) in a seminal 
paper on ‘perfect implementation’ which has 
particular relevance in the transport sector (Ison and 
Rye, 2002). Gunn states that ‘the circumstances 
external to the implementing agency should not impose 
crippling constraints’. In other words, for 
implementation to occur, one needs to ensure that the 
policy is acceptable to all parties that have the power 
to veto it (Ison and Rye, 2002). Assuming rational 
behaviour, the policy-making actors will devise 
strategies for the implementation process, which will 
result in maximising their own benefits: as such there 
will be both winners and losers and/or successful and 
unsuccessful implementation. There are examples of 
urban areas that have managed to implement radical 
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car restraint policies without the associated negative 
consequences often experienced. 
The aim of the paper is to examine a selection of 
existing schemes from across the world and briefly 
describe some of the common difficulties faced by those 
responsible for implementing transport projects. In 
order to achieve this objective a series of vignettes 
were constructed based on in-depth interviews with 
key stakeholders, which is all important when 
attempting to understand the reasons for scheme 
implementation. The paper explains how transport 
practitioners have overcome adverse public reaction in 
practice. For example, the paper outlines how the 
‘Ring of Steel’ in London was introduced, how 
Electronic Road Pricing was ‘sold’ to the public in 
Singapore, and how motorists pay to enter Manhattan 
and San Francisco via bridge and tunnel charges. Eight 
strategies are identified for future policy 
implementation. Four of the strategies focus on 
‘sweetening the pill’ of potentially unpopular 
measures while three aim to convince the motorist 
that the new policy is in fact a reasonable response to 
the traffic problem. The final strategy suggests that 
transport policy goals need to be met through the 
sympathetic introduction of other ostensibly unrelated 
policies – or ‘joined-up’ policy-making. Finally the 
paper offers some lessons for European policy-makers, 
revealing how ‘alternative’ implementation strategies 
could be shaped and adopted within Europe. 
It is important to state at the outset that the case 
studies are at a high level of generalisation. In each 
case one key issue/aspect has been identified. This is 
not to say that the implementation of any such 
initiative can be distilled down to simply one factor 
but the aim has been to offer an insight which may 
provide an important catalyst for change in urban 
areas worldwide.
What is meant by ‘Implementation’? 
The term ‘implementation’ can be defined in many 
ways. For the purposes of this paper, ‘implementation’ 
can be viewed as: ‘policies, actions or decisions 
relevant to the target population that can be put into 
effect at ‘street level’, and ‘implementers’ as those 
responsible for doing that. As the definition implies, 
the policy process does not end once agreement has been 
reached on a proposal. The agreement still has to be 
implemented before the policy has any real existence. 
Bardach (1977) has described the implementation 
process as a game (see also Mendrinou, 1996, 13–16). 
According to Lane (1995), there are a number of aspects 
of the implementation process other than the 
accomplishment of the policy objectives. These 
include:
• the strategies and tactics employed by various 
parties to the implementation game;
• the mechanism of delay as a decision parameter;
• the variety of motives among the participating 
actors; and
• the need for coalition building and fixing the game.
As implementation theory suggests, one of the most 
favourable conditions for successful implementation is 
where policy-makers and implementers develop a co-
operative relationship (Richardson, 1996, 290). 
Indeed, Cram (1997, 84) suggests ‘if policies are 
formulated in the absence of active and enthusiastic 
participation by those whose co-operation is essential 
at the implementation stage, then implementation 
failure is more likely’. Pressman and Wildawsky 
(1984) suggest that correct implementation usually 
involves several semi-independent organisations or 
agencies, each of which can, to a large extent, block or 
change the direction of implementation. When a 
situation arises where implementation failure becomes 
so evident that a process of ‘re-steering’ (Lundquist, 
1972, 33) has to take place, policy-makers must take 
action to encourage or force implementers to behave in 
ways more likely to achieve the set policy objectives 
(Richardson, 1996). 
The Alternative Strategies
The following vignettes form practical examples of 
how existing examples of radical transport schemes 
might be classified according to a simple strategic 
implementation framework.
Compensating losers 
The introduction of road user charging in Singapore 
in 1975 has long been seen as a ‘one off’ event, which 
was only possible because of unique circumstances not 
least in that the citizens are essentially law abiding, 
and that there are no alternative cities for businesses 
to relocate to. While this certainly played a large 
part in the introduction of the original low-tech Area 
Licensing Scheme which used paper windshield 
stickers enforced through visual inspection by traffic 
inspectors within a single cordon, it was somewhat less 
important when an Electronic Road Pricing system was 
adopted in 1998. 
Instead, what is less well publicised is that the 
Singapore Government made a policy decision to ensure 
that the majority of people benefited as a result of the 
change. This was achieved by granting rebates to 
certain road user groups. For example, taxis were given 
road tax rebates for the first three years after 
implementation, while businesses were given four 
years of rebates. In addition, a S$60 a month levy 
imposed on owners of non-residential parking spaces 
was replaced by a nominal S$1 per space per month 
licence fee in the same year. In other words, the 
Government effectively ‘bribed’ the public to ensure 
that the scheme had a chance of working in the first 
year, and gambled on the scheme being accepted by the 
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time the rebates were withdrawn.
Such an approach was suitable as the main 
objective of the scheme was – and is – to manage traffic 
levels rather than raise revenue. The costs of the 
‘subsidies’ were written off as a necessary 
implementation cost.
Bribing the motorist not to drive
Certainly the most overt way of ‘incentivising’ 
drivers out of their cars is by paying to them not to use 
their cars for certain trips – i.e. effectively bribing 
motorists to use an alternative mode. One application 
of this principle – the parking cash out – is becoming 
increasingly common in the UK. Annual schemes 
operate at Southampton General Hospital (Bailey, 
2002) and at Orange’s new Bristol office (Baker, 2003), 
while a monthly pass system operates at the Vodafone 
offices in Newbury, Berkshire (Hopkins, 2003).
Still more radical, the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer 
began operating a parking cash out scheme that 
rewards non-car commuters on a daily basis among staff 
at its research and production facilities. The scheme 
was launched at Sandwich, in Kent in June 2001 and at 
Walton Oaks near Reigate, Surrey in December 2001 
(Elliot and Chadwick, 2002). This works by using staff 
personalised security pass ‘proximity card’ technology 
with an employee’s card credited with enough points 
to ‘pay’ for one month’s parking. The card opens the 
parking barriers and records how many points are used. 
If not used for parking, staff then cash in these parking 
points at the end of each month, which are paid 
through the payroll. Staff at the Sandwich site 
receive £2 per day for leaving their car at home, while 
at Walton Oaks the incentive is £5 a day – a reflection 
of the far tighter parking standards set by the local 
planning authority at the Reigate site. Overall, it is 
estimated that the value of cash outs given to staff 
will amount to approximately £0.5m a year, and 
currently around one-third of staff travel to work by 
modes other than the private car.
It is not only parking spaces that motorists are paid 
to give up – in some cases they are paid to give up their 
cars. For example, during Green Transport Week in June 
1999, public transport operator ‘First Glasgow’ 
introduced the ‘Swap a banger for a bus’ scheme, which 
led to more than 500 residents from Glasgow swapping 
their car for an annual bus pass worth £560 (BIA, 1999). 
In the U.S.A. too, a car cash out project is being tested 
by the State of Washington and public transport 
operator King County Metro in Seattle, through 
funding from the Federal Highway Administration 
value pricing programme (VPP, 2001).
Highlighting the benefits 
By contrast in Oslo, road tolls were introduced in 
the city to raise money in order to pay for new 
transport infrastructure, and not to reduce traffic 
congestion. This meant that the ‘rebate route’ might 
exempt too many people for the required amount of 
money to be raised. Indeed, the charges introduced 
were relatively low and were spread across the 
‘population’ as far as possible so that they could 
maintain traffic levels and maximise revenue. 
In the Norwegian case therefore, the important 
objective was to convince the public that the money 
they were being asked to pay was being used to 
directly benefit them as motorists. Accordingly, much 
effort was spent on a well targeted and publicised 
information campaign, which was aided by the charge 
being implemented only 14 days after the Oslo Tunnel 
(i.e. Festningstunnelen) was opened to traffic. 
Offering more choice to the road user
The key reason for drivers accepting the High 
Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane facility on Interstate 15 to 
the north of San Diego, is that drivers are offered a 
genuine and informed choice. Motorists can use the 
general purpose lanes for free with the likelihood of 
being delayed, or else they can pay but enjoy a hassle 
free and predictable journey time.
The HOT facility originally opened in 1988 as a 
High Occupancy Vehicle lane to buses, vanpools and 
two-person carpools (Shreffler et al., 2001). In 1991, it 
was suggested that the lanes could be opened to single 
occupancy vehicles (SOV) as only 50% of the two 
lanes’ capacity was being utilised while adjacent 
general-purpose lanes were experiencing severe 
congestion during peak periods. It was not until 
December 1996 that the HOT lane became a reality. 
As drivers approach the HOT lane, variable 
message signs advise them of the toll to use the 
facility. The level of this toll depends on how much 
spare capacity is available in the general purpose 
lanes, and varies from US$0.50 to US$4 in normal 
circumstances, with drivers paying more to use HOT 
lane when the general purpose lanes are congested. 
Around US$430,000 of the annual US$1.6m toll revenue 
covers operating costs, and US$60,000 is received by 
the California Highway Patrol in order to enforce the 
operation of the lanes. State law requires the 
remaining money to be spent on developing the express 
lanes and improving the public transport service along 
the corridor, specifically, the express bus service 
known as the Inland Breeze, which began operating in 
November 1997. While initially there were concerns 
that these would become ‘Lexus Lanes’ – i.e. only used 
by the rich – this has not been borne out in practice.
The lesser of two evils
Related to this, is the idea that the public is 
provided with two choices, one of which is even more 
politically unpalatable – yet just as logical or 
reasonable – as the favoured one. A recent example of 
this approach occurred in the City of Durham before 
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the introduction of the congestion charge near the 
Cathedral in October 2002 (Ieromonachou et al., 2003). 
In summary, the problem was that traffic was 
causing problems for the World Heritage Site of the 
city’s cathedral and castle, as well as for pedestrian 
shoppers in the city centre. Accordingly, a transport 
study demonstrated that action needed to be taken – a 
position appreciated by almost everyone – either car 
drivers were to be charged for driving in the congestion 
area or else banned altogether. Given the alternative, 
it became the less controversial route for the council to 
adopt the access charge.
It might have been worse…
A similar tactic was used to herald the introduction 
of London’s Congestion Charge in February 2003. 
Hostile newspaper reporting prior to the introduction 
of the charge and predictions of traffic chaos by the 
London Mayor (Webster, 2003), combined with a 
lessening in traffic due to a half term school holiday, 
meant that for the first week the charge performed far 
better than expected. Consequently, after the first 
week of congestion charging the scheme was seen as a 
policy success. Further research is obviously required, 
however, before labels such as ‘success’ or ‘failure’ can 
be assigned to this scheme. 
Adapting tried, tested and accepted methods
Despite the recent media frenzy surrounding the 
launch of the London Congestion Charging Scheme in 
February 2003, two cities in the USA (San Francisco 
and New York City) have been charging vehicles to 
enter or exit downtown areas for many years. The two 
cities were able to introduce such a measure with 
virtually no adverse political problems. Drivers are 
required to pay tolls to cross eight ‘Caltrans’ bridges in 
the Bay Area of California, including the four bridges 
to enter San Francisco (Caltrans, 2000). Similarly in 
New York City, drivers crossing into Manhattan must 
pay to use seven of the city’s bridges and two tunnels 
(MTA, 2003). This apparent public acceptance 
indicates that drivers are happy to pay to use a 
facility such as a bridge or a tunnel, whereas the idea 
of paying to enter the downtown area of a city would be 
extremely controversial. Fundamentally though, it 
could be argued that there is no real difference in that 
both are paying to use a designated section of road. The 
lesson here would therefore seem to be that 
‘traditional’ charges that have been in place and 
accepted for many years might do an equally effective 
job as something seen as new, radical and threatening, 
but with rather less opposition. In addition, paying for 
a new ‘service’ is less galling than paying for 
something that previously cost nothing.
The Trojan Horse
Perhaps the classic case of a transport policy being 
introduced by a ‘trigger mechanism’ – i.e. on the back 
of a totally unrelated policy – is that of the so-called 
‘Ring of Steel’ imposed on the City of London in 1993. 
This policy was instigated almost overnight in 
response to a terrorist bomb attack in Bishopsgate, and 
involved restricting access to the central core of the 
city. In addition to the closure of 17 minor streets and 
the conversion of 13 roads to one way, traffic signals 
were altered at 23 junctions and public transport and 
pedestrians were given greater priority (Cairns et al., 
1998). Overall, as a result of what was a security 
policy – in the eyes of the public at least – traffic 
entering the restricted area fell by a quarter from 
160,000 vehicles a day, and pollution levels were 15% 
lower. There was however, a slight increase in traffic 
levels on the zone boundary.
Interestingly, the bomb exploded only a month 
before a traffic scheme known as “The Key to the 
Future” was due to be implemented that was also 
designed to restrict traffic for environmental reasons, 
and so significant elements of this proposal were 
incorporated into the security operation. 
The Manchester bomb that exploded on Corporation 
Street in the City Centre on 15 June 1996 caused severe 
damage to the buildings and infrastructure of the city’s 
retail and commercial district and enabled the city 
stakeholders (e.g. local politicians, residents and 
retail organisations) to think boldly about transport 
issues. The bomb resulted in the closure of four central 
streets and yet the city continued to function normally. 
As such, the closures were made permanent as far as 
general traffic was concerned with a small number of 
streets being pedestrianised, whereas in other streets, 
access was limited to buses, taxis and servicing 
vehicles, or in some cases, the direction of traffic was 
altered thereby changing the routes of some of the 
city’s bus services (GMTU, 2001). 
Overall therefore, it may be worth transport 
planners becoming more involved with the Emergency 
Planning sections at local councils. A note of warning is 
that care must be taken in choosing the ‘right sort’ of 
emergency. For example, the fuel shortages caused by a 
blockade of refineries by hauliers and farmers during 
September 2000 – arguably an unforeseeable 
emergency – were blamed on the Government and not 
the protesters, due to the high level of tax on fuel, 
presumably because it is under the Government’s 
control. It is questionable whether this was the right 
sort of ‘emergency’. War or problems in the Middle 
East on the other hand, have allowed Governments to 
ration petrol (or at least prepare to ration petrol). In 
the UK petrol rationing was implemented between 23 
September 1939 and 26 May 1950 due to the Second 
World War, and again in 1956 because of the Suez 
Crisis. In addition, it was almost adopted during the 
oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 (Harman, 2002).
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Finally, deteriorating air quality due to high 
traffic levels and unfavourable weather conditions 
have led to Paris and several Italian cities adopting 
‘alternate plate’ days, whereby only traffic with an 
odd or even numbered registration plate is allowed into 
the city, and even to total traffic bans. Such action has 
been driven by concerns over poor health. Similar 
conditions could perhaps be created by taking 
advantage of particularly bad weather or some other 
‘Acts of God’, or more predictably by maintenance 
problems closing roads, bridges (e.g. Hammersmith 
Bridge, see Rees and Williams, 1998) or car parks (for 
example, Lancashire County Council was forced to 
close an employee multistory car park due to structural 
problems in early 2003). 
‘Conventional’ Implementation of Good Practice
The vignettes highlight a number of important 
lessons that can be learnt from the successes and 
failures of radical demand management schemes to 
date. As demonstrated by the Cambridge experience of 
road pricing (Ison, 1998), these are not necessarily 
always about the technology issues but can often be 
about how schemes are designed, the effective 
inclusion of user concerns and political sensitivity. For 
example, there has to be a climate for change, i.e. 
congestion should be perceived as a major problem 
before the public are likely to accept a change in 
policy direction. In other words, the proposed policy or 
scheme needs to be supported by politicians of all 
political persuasions and the general public need to 
understand the problem before they are likely to 
accept or even support it. 
Those responsible for developing the policy or 
scheme can only gain public acceptability if the aims 
and objectives are clearly defined, complementary to 
other sectoral policies and widely inclusive at all 
stages of the decision making process – from as early on 
in the process as possible (Wixey & Ruiz, 2003). 
Achieving at least some of the benefits promised as 
quickly as possible, yet at the same time not trying to 
achieve too much in the early stages are also vital 
lessons that can be learnt from some of the ‘successful’ 
schemes highlighted above. In other words, it could be 
argued that piecemeal implementation may create 
better results than implementation by stealth. One of 
the criticisms often levelled at transport schemes is 
that they do not offer a realistic alternative to 
travellers who wish to switch from the car. 
Fortunately, this was a lesson that the London 
Congestion Charging scheme took on board, and an 
increase in the number of buses and bus routes provided 
meant that there was a realistic alternative in place 
before the congestion charge was introduced.
One of the most important lessons to be learnt is 
that the implementation process needs to be both 
transparent and flexible. The process must be able to 
adapt to changing circumstances, public attitudes, 
objectives and technology changes and that it can react 
to ‘unexpected’ events.
Additional levers
These ‘conventional’ lessons are certainly 
important. But what the vignettes also demonstrate is 
that in many cases of successful implementation there 
were additional factors that helped transform 
uncertain outcomes into positive results. These are 
summarised in Table 1.
Clearly, the strategies suggested above are already 
implemented to varying degrees in most transport 
projects, but have possibly not been set out quite so 
bluntly in the past. It is also obvious that the 
appropriateness of some or all of these strategies is 
strongly dependent on the particular circumstances of a 
proposed scheme. 
Conclusion
This paper has shown that there is no single model 
of policy implementation that will guarantee a 
successful policy outcome. It is clear that in many of 
the more radical schemes adopted around the world, 
additional strategies have been employed, either 
Table 1: Radical transport schemes should be…
WISE So the public perceive there is a problem and the policy seems a reasonable way of solving it
COMPENSATORY So the public see they benefit from the scheme, are compensated in some way for any disbenefits, or 
are provided with a viable and acceptable alternative means of travel
SUPPORTED So the public feel that other organisations or individuals are convinced the scheme is the right way to go
CONSULTED So the public feel they have been properly consulted as to their opinions, and these have at least been 
listened to and ideally acted upon
INDISPENSABLE So the public feel there is no alternative (or that it is the least worst alternative)
COMPARABLE So the public perceive that the scheme is not so different to existing schemes or if they have had 
experience of similar schemes
STIMULATED So the public believe that the scheme is implemented as a response to some kind of crisis that is 
beyond the Government’s control – e.g. an act of terrorism or a national emergency – or obviously for 
the public good – e.g. drink driving, security
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deliberately or almost accidentally. The evidence also 
suggests that there is scope for combining suitable 
strategies in order to increase acceptability still 
further. This paper has provided an alternative way 
of looking at the implementation process.
It is the implementation of a project – and in 
particular in convincing the public and/or local, 
national and European politicians – rather than the 
planning or even the financing of a project that 
determines whether it should go ahead or not. As this 
paper suggests, it must be recognised that modelling 
the process of executing public policies – i.e. the 
implementation process – is different from evaluating 
the extent to which objectives have been 
accomplished – the implementation assessment. In 
essence, not all policies that are ‘successfully’ 
implemented actually meet their original objectives.
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